Sun24 News

Wirecard Sacked, Season 1: Fifth episode, The IT

An investigative podcast about the Wirecard scandal in Munich's Stadelheim court

Another episode of the 'Wirecard Sacked' podcast, this season 1 is about detailed insider accounts of the proceedings in Munich's Stadelheim prison courtroom that have been going on for well over a year.

This is the fifth episode about the Wirecard trial, more will follow every 2 to 3 days.

Contents:
The Softbank representative (→ 00:58)
Were they sure at Softbank that everything is ok? (→ 04:01)
A few weeks later, an IT director was interrogated (→ 04:48)
The Elastic Engine also in Toronto (→ 05:57)
The requests of von Erffa (→ 08:55)
The server upgrades of the zero business (→ 11:23)
And still nothing happens (→ 13:12)

Season 1, Episode 5

Wirecard Sacked - The Court Proceeding

00:00

Here is the article on investment-related Wirecard issues discussed at the beginning:
The Great Orchestra - About Wirecard's share price and dolphins against sharks

Here the court testimony of Spencer Collins from July 2023, a lawyer working on Softbank's side on their nearly 1 billion euros investment into Wirecard from mid 2019:
Softbank-Deal Details - About Credit Suisse notes over 1 billion euros

Here is the important article about the questioning of the IT director from May 2023:
Pandoras Box - About Wirecard's IT Architectures

And here an overview over many Wirecard witness testimonies:
Wirecard Testimonies

Previous
Episode 4 - The Insolvency

Next
Episode 6 - Marsalek's Letter


Transcript 

(Music) 

Wirecard sacked, a Sun24 News Podcast, Season 1, Episode 5. 

Jörg: I'll try again very carefully. The resolution of the Wirecard case, which was formulated on July 22, was a joint process involving various parties. 

Martin: I wrote another article about the circumstances, the financial circumstances of investors at the time of this insolvency, and things came out that made my head spin for the fifth or sixth time. So it was exciting again, but I don't want to go into that this time. I'll post the article below for people who are interested. There are a few more things that are great. So here we are in April. I was really expecting every week that the proceedings would be suspended and then it went on diligently. Now the Softbank representative came. 

Jörg: Oh yes, oh yes, Credit Suisse. Angermeyer. I'm quiet, I'm quiet. That's crazy. So it's crazy what's happening. Christian Angermeyer, the toadstool of the German investor scene. 

Martin: Perhaps you could explain in a sentence or two how Angermeyer is connected so that people who have no idea at all can understand it all. 

Jörg: So google the name Christian Angermeyer. You might find a Wall Street Journal article from a few days ago. Let's dig a little deeper. I'll be very brief. Christian Angermeyer was an advisor on this Softbank deal for 900 million, both on the Softbank side and on the Wirecard side. How much did he get for this deal? 20, 22 million in total. And yes, you first have to manage to make a profit of 22 million from the biggest collapse in German economic history. Not bad either. A gift is not bad either. That's all I'm going to say for now. 

Martin: So I was already thinking to myself when the Softbank representative, this person who was responsible on the Softbank side in Japan for arranging and the details of this deal, a huge investment, almost a billion, which Softbank initiated with Wirecard in mid-2019. 900 million I think, so a huge sum. At a time when some flags have already been raised about Wirecard, it has to be said. 

Jörg: Softbank was very decisive. I followed the discussions. Softbank's 900 million investment outside of Germany, outside of a possibly questionable thing that was going on in Germany, Softbank invested 900 million in Wirecard from outside. That was an accolade. That was very, very decisive. But it's often forgotten. 

Martin: That actually happened because the Softbank representative confirmed what you had just researched much more deeply. Of course, Angermeyer's name wasn't mentioned, but he ultimately made it clear that this 900 million was financed via certain bonds and capital market constructs that Credit Suisse had commissioned. They invented them, if you like. So they financed this 900 million for someone and it was somehow procured via the capital market. And Credit Suisse employees pocketed their 20, 30, 50, 100 million for this acquisition of this enormous sum? 

Jörg: That's a very important point. I think I was there too. I can't remember exactly who earned how much. But two things. Softbank investigated the whole thing. Softbank supposedly did a great job of knocking off Wirecard. But can you remember, there was this moment when the judge, Födisch, I think, asked the Softbank man, were you actually sure that everything was okay? And he said something like, well, not really. That was that day, wasn't it? Yes, exactly. Hey guys, 900 million. Then the whole thing, Softbank has really stayed out of it. It has no risk at all. They pass on this risk, which they haven't actually examined in detail, to Credit Suisse. What is Credit Suisse doing? It sold these products to investors. You have to take a look at that. 

Martin: Again, the name Jan Marsalek was mentioned very often. Jan Marsalek is said to have been particularly responsible for this Softbank deal. And to be on the safe side, they wanted a list of their customers. A few weeks later, an IT director who worked directly under Ms. Steidl arrived. So Ms. Steidl, you have to imagine, the name is certainly familiar to some, was the CTO, so to speak, the Chief Technology Officer or CIO, the Chief Information Officer, i.e. the person appointed at board level, responsible for the entire IT area. But the dirty work, the real work, was actually done by her direct representative and employee. A lady with, I think, an Indian name. In any case, an IT director. And she testified a few days later that Jan Marsalek had actually approached her or Ms. Steidl had approached her and that Jan Marsalek had then requested that Wirecard draw up a list of merchants specifically for the Softbank deal. The questioning of the IT director was really exciting because she explained how this list came about. And that was really exciting. Of course, they had to knock everywhere first. So in Asia, because there were third-party partners and these third-party partners had partners again and which ones were Wirecard partners or not. And they also called Toronto, among other places. According to this IT director, Toronto had a cloud, i.e. a computer server running Wirecard software. And this was also outsourced via the North American business in Toronto. 

Jörg: Toronto has been around for a very long time. That has little to do with the North American business, the later one. And I think that the Elastic Engine or whatever it was called, which was very important for Heike Pauls and so on, as proof and so on, Elastic Engine, that was great. I mean, it's been around for a long time. And I mean, it ran entirely in Toronto. And it's quite exciting, because it was later said that the fact that the TPA business wasn't rooted anywhere at Wirecard was proof that it didn't exist. But I think you'll figure it out. There were clouds, there were satellites. The fact that there was nothing in Ascheim proves exactly nothing. But I think you'll figure it out anyway. 

Martin: Right. So there was nothing directly in Ascheim. But next to Ascheim there was a data service, a data center, where this software, the Wirecard software, was run. The Elastic Engine, which actually only forwarded requests and transaction processes to various other servers, was not only running in Toronto, in my opinion, but on various servers. I have the impression that it was installed everywhere, which I think only became apparent in the months that followed. And to this day, it is still a mystery and hard to understand exactly where and how this Elastic Engine was set up. Which third-party partners or fourth or fifth partners ultimately used this software, by and with and via Wirecard, is still practically impossible to solve and explain. 

Jörg: Tell me, Mr. Martin, where did all the data actually go? 

(Music) 

Martin: Yes, that's what everyone is asking, I think, isn't it? The IT manager in Toronto asked herself the same question and then called this IT service provider in the cloud and asked for a list of their dealers. And the amazing thing was that the IT manager, the director then explained in the courtroom that they hooked the phone to her on the other side. As soon as she said, please, I have a list and then what for, he asked and said, yes, for a Softbank deal and then the employee said, yes, no, so we only outsource the cloud here and other third-party providers do that again and they definitely don't get a customer list from us. And that was the end of the conversation from Toronto. 

Jörg: I'll interject again very briefly. Because there was a moment, now we're jumping ahead. It was called the DPR, that's the German Financial Reporting Enforcement Panel, this two-tier BaFin. In 2020, which is very interesting, they sent a request to Erfa. They want dealer data. Then he asked Erfa and then Marsalek and Bellenhaus, I think, told him, well, yes, we can send retailer data, but not to Erfa, because it's so secret, but directly to the DPR. That's another way of saying that Aschheim was kept in the fog, deliberately kept in the fog. That's one thing. The second is now in brackets, because I'm deflecting a bit. But that also means that the DPR had or has dealer lists that are nowhere to be found. Where were they in the committee of inquiry? That would have been really interesting. 

Martin: Absolutely. It's getting more and more exciting. I can confirm what you just said about the one from Erfa, because there was another situation. I can't remember exactly when that was. Whether it was in the middle of 2023 or already this year, when an email was thrown onto the court projector at some point during a witness hearing, in which it was stated that the one from Erfa requested that a list of employees at a company in Dubai be sent to him now. And the person from Erfa writes in this e-mail exchange that he is now writing to the person responsible in Dubai and she would like a list of all employees and to finally send it to him. And then he just gets a casual reply: "I'll be happy to do that, but I've already told you, there are three or four employees in total". Erfa then replies. So it's all in writing, in black and white, it's so bizarre that half the people who listen to this podcast probably think it can't be true. 

Jörg: Yes, maybe they think it more often. 

Martin: So it's in black and white, you have to imagine that. It's written in black and white, and Erfa responds. Completely furious. In English of course, translate it into German: Good woman, if you don't send me a list of your 100 or 200 employees right now, I'll take disciplinary action. And then you will soon be out of a job. Then I'll make sure that your supervisor will probably look around Bellenhaus to find out that you had such a great job in Dubai, your longest life. And then that's it. So he's really angry. And now we have to go back to this IT story. I don't think many people realize that in the last 10 years or so, we have created a world of financial transactions, a digital world, where it is actually possible to process hundreds of millions of payments using technology and with very few employees. This is possible without any human being being involved. That's what software does. It is even more advantageous to have few employees for such business models because the overhead is then low. You pay less and let the software run automatically. The court assumes a business world that would have been appropriate 30 or 40 years ago, but not today in the modern world. So for me, it is visible and recognizable every other week that somehow the leap to the digital world is not quite up to scratch for certain people in charge of justice. That's my impression. What do you think? 

Jörg: Absolutely. But as far as I understand it, this software is running and its scalability is actually only limited by the size of the servers, which can only handle a certain number of transactions... Is that correct ? 

Martin: Yes, absolutely. 

Jörg: And it was also the problem that this business, which supposedly never took place, caused capacity problems and they had to upgrade some of their servers in Dubai. And there are also some dialogs. But it's also strange that they were able to reach their capacity limits, even though there were no transactions. That's actually pointless. Luftbude. Exactly. Why should I expand an air booth with more servers? 

(Music) 

Jörg: Jackson was also interesting. He was also some technician who said that they had two billion transactions and that they had processed them in Dubai. Födisch takes note of this, no questions, nothing. He sits there and silently looks around the table. 

Martin: And then the mass media continue to spout their airhead narrative. Nothing else happens. That's... 

Jörg: Martin, how many hundred more stories are we supposed to tell? That's actually the point. Well, I don't know, as I said, I was thinking about writing a book. I could write a whole encyclopedia. Nobody believes us, the book. It's actually unbelievable. 

Martin: So we're almost in the fall or the end of 2023, I think. There were a number of other witnesses. Again, I'll post the link down there under the postcast. There you can have an overview of all these interrogations. Are there a few more that you should mention that are particularly important? 

Jörg: Well, the questioning of the Soko was a tipping point for me. I've already mentioned that. The second tipping point, of course, was the motions for evidence in July, July 13. How many pages? It was announced several weeks beforehand. The thing is, when Dierlamm lowers his voice and becomes very quiet, you have to listen carefully. And then he stated, Mr. Födisch, I would need a day to present a motion for evidence. And then I thought, oha, that's finally it. Company names kept coming up, but at that point I had nothing concrete.

(Music)

Speaker:
Jörg - longtime Wirecard expert and investigator
Martin - Investigative lead at Sun24 News and Wirecard expert

Organization and realization:
Martin D. / Sun24 News

Wirecard Sacked

The Court Proceeding - Season 1, Episode 10 - Final

Wirecard Sacked

The Court Proceeding - Season 1, Episode 9

Wirecard Sacked

The Court Proceeding - Season 1, Episode 8

Wirecard Sacked

The Court Proceeding - Season 1, Episode 7

Wirecard Sacked

The Court Proceeding - Season 1, Episode 6

Wirecard Sacked

The Court Proceeding - Season 1, Episode 4

Wirecard Sacked

The Court Proceeding - Season 1, Episode 3

Wirecard Sacked

The Court Proceeding - Season 1, Episode 2

Wirecard Sacked

The Court Proceeding - Season 1, Episode 1

The Wirecard Summer Gap

About extorted confessions and Bavarian radio news

Money launding is not my thing

About Commerzbank and cancelled Wirecard credit lines

Wirecard Chances

About supervisory board advising lawyers

The Wirecard PR Court

About an obscure questioning of a Wirecard lawyer

Wirecard Rogue

About crazy judiciary talks and on-target court motions

Wirecard Untangled

About unsolved issues in Germany's master finance scandal

La Vie en Wirecard

About strong Spanish financial analyses and weak French allegations

All Inside The Singapore Folder

About Wirecard book keepings an email conversations

Grand Vision Trust

A Wirecard Bank Director and Relationship Managements

Mount Interim

About a Wirecard interim-CEO on a Swiss rose mountain

Harvesting Wirecard

About Swiss roses and Wirecard bears

The PayLondon Group

About bears from London and Wirecard targetings

Mount Acronis

About a Swiss IT sponsor and Wirecard entanglements

Magic Pav

About a Wirecard whistleblower and magic law firms

The Trial

About a Wirecard release of prisoner and Franz Kafka's unfinished works

The Grand Orchestra

About Wirecard's share price and dolphins against sharks

Mount Wirecard

About Swiss Wirecard entanglements and the remains of Crypto AG

Wirecard Court Halftime

About seven months in Munich Stadelheim and the miracle of Bern

Pandora's Box

About Wirecard's IT Architectures

The Third Man

About Wirecard's interim CEO James Freis and nice shoes

Deflective Attorneys

About a five hours Wirecard indictment

Bavariacard

About a Germanic Wirecard Poker

A Munich Fraud

Wirecard and Munich's Public Prosecutor's Office

Royal Courts of Wirecard

About a Wirecard Lawsuit and Quantum Physics

Brilliant Consultants

About Wirecard's financial auditors and the chess game

Back To The Wirecard

About the roots of the insolvent German payment provider

BaFin The Thirteenth

An April 13th day at the Wirecard investigational committee